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Abstract Schlenker (2013) gives a number of puzzling counterexamples to the
widely accepted claim that non-restrictive relative clauses (NRCs) are always in-
terpreted with respect to the global context, and never in the scope of entailment-
canceling operators such as if. Local readings are available for NRCs attached
to their host clause by a coordinating coherence relation. This paper develops a
theoretical explanation of this pattern. We argue that NRCs are interpreted locally
only if they are attached locally to their host clause both in syntax and in discourse
structure. Subordinating coherence relations like Elaboration and Explanation resist
discourse attachment in the scope of if because they tend to go together with rela-
tions that can only hold between speech acts. Like other subordinate clauses, NRCs
tend to express subordinating coherence relations, which ultimately explains their
pervasive tendency for global interpretation. In other words, this study shows how a
theory of discourse coherence can help solve a problem in sentence semantics.
Keywords: projection, appositives, relative clauses, coherence relations
1 Introduction
As is well known, non-restrictive relative clauses (NRCs) present a problem for
compositional semantics. Despite their embedded position, they typically do not con-
tribute to the meaning of the embedding sentence. Rather, they are quite stubbornly
interpreted like independent sentences. For example, the sentence in (1a) entails
that the dean hates the speaker, although the NRC that provides this information is
embedded in the antecedent of a conditional.
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(1) a. If Peter calls the dean, who hates me, I would be in deep trouble.
b. The dean hates me.
c. 6 If Peter calls the dean and the dean hates me, I would be in trouble.
Standard accounts are designed to ensure invariantly a wide-scope interpretation of
NRCs. Basically, there are two ways to do this: Syntactic approaches assume that
NRCs outscope the embedding clause because they are attached high in the syntactic
tree (at CP-level, McCawley 1982), or even syntactically orphaned (Safir 1986; Fabb
1990; Espinal 1991). Alternatively, it has been argued that NRCs are attached locally
to their host clause at DP (Del Gobbo 2003; Potts 2005) or at IP level, but that the
content they contribute projects, i.e. is interpreted globally, outside the context of the
embedding sentence. This happens because that content is semantically (Potts 2005)
or pragmatically (AnderBois, Brasoveanu & Henderson 2011; Simons, Tonhauser,
Beaver & Roberts 2011) not-at-issue, or because NRCs have their own illocutionary
force (Koev 2013).
Recent work on NRCs, however, has challenged this view showing that the
content of NRCs interacts in multiple ways with the content of the main clause
(Nouwen 2007; Arnold 2007; AnderBois et al. 2011; Sæbø 2011). Moreover,
Schlenker (2013: 7) points out English and French examples where the NRC is
interpreted locally in the scope of entailment-canceling operators like if. For instance,
(2a), adapted from Schlenker 2013: 7, does not tell us that the dean called the chair,
but instead has the local reading in (2c): The NRC contributes to the restriction of
the conditional.
(2) a. If Peter called the dean, who then called the chair, I would be in trouble.
b. 6 The dean called the chair.
c. If P. called the dean and the dean called the chair, I would be in trouble.
First experimental results from German confirm the existence of such local readings,
but suggest that their availability is dependent on the type of coherence relation
established between the NRC and its host clause (Poschmann 2018). These find-
ings challenge existing approaches to NRCs. No worked-out explanation of this
phenomenon has been offered so far. The present paper addresses the following
questions: How can we explain the existence of local readings of NRCs? Why do
coherence relations affect the scope of NRCs? And why are global readings still
preferred most of the time?
After a brief empirical overview in section 2, we argue that NRCs are locally
attached to their host clause in the syntax, but not necessarily semantically conjoined
in that position. Rather they are connected to their host clause by an underspecified
coherence relation which must be resolved pragmatically (section 3). That pragmatic
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inference is guided by the same principles as the inference of coherence relations be-
tween independent sentences in discourse. In section 4, we show how the traditional
discourse-theoretic distinctions between subordinating and coordinating relations,
and between semantic and presentational relations help explain the role played by
coherence relations in licensing local readings of NRCs. Finally, section 5 addresses
the question of why NRCs project most of the time.
2 Local Readings of NRCs
One of the features that can reveal the position in which an NRC is interpreted is its
tense. The past tense of the NRC in (2) is an instance of ‘fake tense’, that is, it is
bound by the conditional and does not indicate an event in the past. As Schlenker
(2013: 7) points out, replacing the NRC by a parenthetical (3) or a postposed matrix
clause (4) makes the sentence less acceptable because the past tense is no longer
bound by the if -clause. This shows that the NRC in (2) is indeed interpreted locally.
(3) ?? If Peter called the dean (she then called the chair), I would be in trouble.
(4) If Peter called the dean, I would be in trouble. ?? She then called the chair.
However, NRCs do not always allow for local readings. If we try to force the NRC
in (1) into the scope of the conditional by changing its tense to past, the sentence
becomes awkward (5). The past tense seems to resist the bound reading.
(5) ?? If Peter called the Dean, who hated me, I would be in trouble.
Apparently, NRCs allow for local readings only under some special conditions. But
which are those conditions? What makes the difference between (1) and (2)?
Apart from tense, the examples differ, for instance, in the presence/absence of
the anaphoric adverbial then. A straightforward explanation, suggested by Martin
(2016), relates the local interpretation in (2) to the need to bind the anaphoric
adverbial then, which only finds an appropriate antecedent (the event of Max calling
the dean) in the scope of the conditional—a solution parallel to van der Sandt’s (1992)
trapping of presuppositions. However, one should then expect that the pronoun him
in (6), which can only be bound by someone under if, should also be able to trap the
NRC. But, unfortunately, the sentence receives no coherent interpretation, although
the corresponding conjoined conditional does.
(6) If someonea wears this jacket, and it / #which is too big for hima, he will
look silly.
Extending the notion of anaphora that operates in presupposition trapping from
identity to (weakly) causal relations, proposed by Zeevat (2016), does not really help
435
Jasinskaja & Poschmann
either. Even if the NRC in (2) might seem to be trapped by a causal relation—the
dean would not call the chair if Peter did not call the dean—(7) shows that an NRC
can receive an embedded interpretation even in the absence of a causal link or with
inverted temporal order.
(7) If Mary stands in front of Peter, who (first/then/also) moves a little closer to
Max, everyone will fit into the picture.
Schlenker (2013: 42–44) suggests a more promising generalization: The availability
of local readings depends on the coherence relation between the NRC and its host
clause. In (8) we list some common definitions of coherence relations that we
assume throughout this paper (Jasinskaja & Karagjosova forthcoming), which are
not substantially different from those used by Schlenker (2013).
(8) Elaboration(α,β ): α and β describe the same eventuality (or entity, in case
of Entity-Elaboration)
Explanation(α,β ): β describes the cause of the eventuality in α
Result(α,β ): α describes the cause of the eventuality in β
Narration(α,β ): β describes an eventuality that follows that of α in time
and space, but is not necessarily caused by it
Parallel(α,β ): α and β describe similar eventualities
Contrast(α,β ): α and β describe ‘opposite’ eventualities, that is,
α non-monotonically implicates p, while β implicates ¬p
Schlenker suggests that Narration and Result holding between the NRC and its host
clause, cf. (2), make local readings of the NRC possible, whereas Elaboration (9)
and especially Explanation (10) resist local interpretation most strongly.
(9) If John engaged his lawyer, who his mother ordered to file a complaint, ...
 John’s mother ordered his lawyer to file a complaint.
? If John’s mother ordered his lawyer to file a complaint and thereby John
engaged him/her, ...
(10) If John called his aunt, who was / ??were a lawyer, ...
 John’s aunt used to be a lawyer.
6 If John called his aunt because she is a lawyer, ...
Interestingly, this division corresponds to another fundamental division in discourse
structure—that between coordinating (Narration, Result, Parallel, Contrast) and
subordinating coherence relations (Elaboration, Explanation) in the sense of Asher
& Vieu 2005, which we will discuss in more detail later. The hypothesis that
discourse-structural coordination/subordination distinction lies at the core of the
phenomenon at hand is investigated by Poschmann (2018). In a set of acceptability
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tests, she compares German NRCs under wenn ‘if’ to conjoined and parenthetical
clauses, like the English (3), as well as to postposed matrix clauses, like (4). Further
variables in the study are the predicate type (state/event) and the presence/absence
of discourse adverbials such as dann ‘then’. In a context that supports local interpre-
tation, NRCs turn out to be less acceptable than conjoined clauses (about 50% vs.
91%, respectively), but significantly more acceptable than parentheticals (21%) and
postposed matrix clauses (9%). Moreover, forcing a coordinating coherence relation
by discourse adverbials that signal Narration or Contrast raises the acceptability
of local readings of NRCs to about 83% regardless of predicate type. These results
corroborate Schlenker’s intuitions and support Poschmann’s stronger version of the
generalization. Further support comes from examples like (7), where the local inter-
pretation of the NRC appears to be licensed by the Parallel relation to the conditional
clause. In other words, a whole variety of coordinating coherence relations can hold
between the NRC and its host clause embedded under entailment-canceling operators
like if, whereas subordinating relations tend to require global interpretation.
This looks like a nice empirical generalization. However, even if we ignore the
somewhat less clear status of Elaboration (9) for the time being, the pattern still
needs to be explained. Why should coherence relations affect the scope of NRCs
in the first place? Why is the distinction between discourse-structural coordination
and subordination relevant? And finally, why are NRCs interpreted globally most
of the time despite the variety of possibilities for local interpretation that we have
discovered? These are the questions we address in the rest of this paper.
3 Attachment in syntax and semantic interpretation
Before we explain how different kinds of coherence relations affect the projection
pattern of NRCs, we should clarify our assumptions about the syntactic and semantic
representation that serves as input to the inference of coherence relations. What is the
position of NRCs in the syntactic structure of a sentence? How are they semantically
interpreted? And how are they similar to or different from clauses of other kinds?
We follow Schlenker (2013) and Poschmann (2018) in assuming that an NRC
contributes a proposition of type <t> (after having been coindexed with the referent
of its host DP) and is adjoined not higher than to the IP node of the host clause and
not lower than to the node of the host DP. Higher attachment would be problematic
for an account of the bound readings of tense in NRCs discussed in section 2. A
lower position, by contrast, would lead to an interpretation in which the relative
clause restricts the denotation of the DP (Heim & Kratzer 1998). We remain impartial
regarding the question of the exact locus of NRC attachment: whether it is the IP
(as, for instance, in Schlenker’s proposal), the DP (currently the standard assumption
taken in most accounts of NRCs, e.g. Del Gobbo 2003; Koev 2013; Poschmann
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2018), or anywhere in between. We also disregard the question whether the NRC
denotes a predicate <et> like its restrictive counterpart (Heim & Kratzer 1998; Koev
2013; Schlenker 2013) or a proposition <t>. Since in <et> accounts the NRC is
coindexed with its host DP anyway, the contribution of the NRC in the end is still a
proposition. Thus, whichever approach we assume, we get two propositions at the
IP level: that of the host IP and that of the NRC.
One of the central claims of our proposal is that there is no semantic rule that
simply allows to conjoin adjacent propositions, unless there is an actual explicit
connective present, such as and or but, which contributes a conjunction as part of its
encoded semantic content. Instead, adjacent propositions—those of the host clause
and the NRC in particular—are treated much like juxtaposed sentences in discourse.
They are connected by an underspecified coherence relation R, as shown in (11),
which has to be resolved by pragmatic reasoning.1
(11) IP
λRttt.R(JPeter called the deaniK)(Jwhoi called the chairK)
IPJPeter called the deaniK NRCJwhok called the chairK
This inference process may or may not lead to success. If it does, R is instantiated
by a specific coherence relation, e.g. Narration in (2). The proposition that results
from connecting the NRC and the host IP by Narration is assigned to the higher
IP, and if the latter is in the scope of an entailment-canceling operator, the entire
Narration including the content of the NRC is interpreted in the scope of that
operator, cf. (12). Since Narration subsumes the semantics of the natural language
conjunction and (more on this in section 4.3), the inference leads ultimately to
conjoining the propositions of the NRC and the host IP in the scope of if. This is
how we get local readings as in (2). Thinking of coherence relations as a kind of
pragmatic inference, this is similar to the phenomenon of local quantity implicature
(Chierchia 2004) intruding into the compositional semantics of a sentence.
(12) CP
λq.(NARRATION(JPeter called the deaniK)(Jwhoi called the chairK)→ q)
C
λ p.λq.(p→ q)
IP
NARRATION(JPeter called the deaniK)(Jwhoi called the chairK)
1 A similar idea is put forward in Schlenker 2013: 20, who argues that NRCs are semantically connected
to their host clause by an operator • described as ‘the operation by which parataxis in discourse is
evaluated’. For a fully spelled out analysis see Poschmann 2018.
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However, more often than not we fail to establish a coherence relation between the
content of an NRC and that of its host clause at the local level. In that case, only
the proposition of the host clause serves as input to further semantic composition,
the relation R to the proposition expressed by the NRC remains underspecified and
keeps being percolated to higher levels, until it finds a higher discourse attachment
site, which will normally be located at the root clause level, cf. (13).2 This leads to
more generally familiar global, or projective readings of NRCs, as in (1).
(13) CP
λRttt.λq.R(JPeter called the deaniK→ q)(Jwhoi hates meK)
C
λ p.λq.(p→ q)
IP
λRttt.R(JPeter called the deaniK)(Jwhoi hates meK)
In sum, an NRC is interpreted locally in the scope of an entailment-canceling operator
O only if it is attached to a clause in the scope of O both syntactically and discourse-
structurally. Assuming that syntactic attachment of NRCs is local, all depends on
the result of integrating the NRC in the discourse structure. The difference between
NRCs (2) and clausal parentheticals (3) consists in the assumption that the latter
are not syntactically related to their host clause. Therefore, there is no pressure to
integrate parentheticals in the semantic composition, they are interpreted as root
clauses right away and therefore only have global readings. The property of being
syntactically integrated, in turn, is shared by NRCs and coordinate clauses:
(14) If Peter called the dean and she called the chair, I would be in trouble.
However, in coordinate clauses the connective and, but or or tells us explicitly how
to make one proposition out of two. Those propositions may or may not be enriched
with additional pragmatic inferences, i.e. coherence relations in particular, but their
semantic integration does not rely on those inferences, a local relation is present by
virtue of being linguistically encoded, which guarantees local interpretation. NRC
structure by itself tells us that the propositions should be semantically related, but
not how they should be related, and only if the pragmatic inference process leads to
the ‘insertion of an implicit and’ between the host and the NRC proposition, will
NRCs receive local readings similar to those of corresponding conjoined clauses.
4 Coherence relations and the scope of NRCs
It follows from the picture presented above that whether or not an NRC is interpreted
locally depends on whether or not it is attached to its host clause by a coherence
2 See Schlenker 2013: 17 for discussion of potential intermediate readings.
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relation that conjoins the propositions expressed by the clauses. But which factors
determine whether this will be the case? In this section we first consider some
general characteristics of coherence inferences that determine the attachment point
of new discourse material and the choice of coherence relation (section 4.1). We then
discuss features of coherence relations that make them particularly suitable or unsuit-
able for local connection between an NRC and its host clause. The features that we
concentrate on are the source of coherence, which determines whether a coherence
relation can hold in the scope of entailment-canceling operators (section 4.2) and the
compatibility of a relation with natural language conjunction (section 4.3). Accord-
ing to these criteria, Elaboration or Explanation turn out to be largely incapable of
local attachment of NRCs, which confirms Schlenker’s (2013) observations.
4.1 Inference to the best explanation
We adopt the view going back to Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt & Martin 1993 of discourse
interpretation as abduction—a non-monotonic inference mechanism that seeks for
the best explanation of the observed utterances. That is, what must the speaker
have had in mind for her to produce the given discourse? This puts the inference of
coherence relations on a par with Gricean inference (cf. Geurts 2010) as well as more
recent approaches to pragmatics such as the Bayesian Rational Speech Act model
(Frank & Goodman 2012). The preferred attachment point and type of coherence
relation must be likely (relevant, plausible, etc.).
In order to see how much sense local attachment really makes, it is useful to
look at the relationship between the propositions expressed by the NRC and its host
clause outside the embedding context. As we argued in the previous section, in terms
of the degree of implicitness of the coherence relation, NRCs are comparable to
juxtaposed independent utterances. To abstract away from the NRC as a specific
means of expression and be able to evaluate the relevance and plausibility of the
relation as such, one can rephrase the NRC as an independent full sentence or a
fragment DP. If the resulting discourse makes sense, then local attachment with
the inferred coherence relation is by itself a likely interpretation. Applying this
test to (2) and (1) results in (15) and (16), respectively. The discourse in (15) is
perfectly coherent and is readily understood as a Narration, cf. (8). The adverbial
then clearly supports this interpretation. In contrast, (16) does not make that much
sense without further context. The relation could perhaps be characterized as that
between a foreground event and a background state, but it still remains unclear just
why the speaker mentions the dean’s attitude towards him in connection with the
phone call.
(15) Peter called the dean. She then called the chair. Narration
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(16) ? Peter called the dean. She hates me.
However, relative acceptability is reversed once we include the context of the entire
original complex sentence. Now (17) is incomprehensible without further context.
The dean’s call cannot be the result of Peter’s call, because the latter did not take
place. Otherwise, what does the call have to do with the speaker’s potential trouble?
In contrast, (18) makes a lot more sense than (16): The dean’s negative attitude
towards the speaker definitely increases the probability of trouble after Peter’s call,
especially if the latter communicates some unfavorable information about him. This
suggests that the NRC in (1), is not attached by a discourse relation to its host clause,
but rather to the entire sentence: Explanation(φ ,ψ), cf. (19).
(17) ?? If Peter called the Dean, I would be in deep trouble.
She (then) called the Chair.
(18) If Peter called the Dean, I would be in deep trouble. Explanation
She hates me.
(19) [ If Peter called the Dean, [ who hates me ]ψ , I would be in deep trouble. ]φ
Applying abductive reasoning to figure out the NRC’s discourse attachment point
requires considering possible alternative attachments such as those corresponding to
(16) and (18). If the content of the NRC is more relevant in the context of the entire
sentence than in the context of the host clause alone and assuming that the NRC is
otherwise not a more likely expression for local than for global attachment, the latter
ends up as the preferred reading, which places the NRC outside the scope of if.3
The availability of a particular alternative attachment site can be affected by its
prominence, or the degree of activation at the current point in discourse development.
For instance in (20), discourse attachment of the NRC goes together with the
resolution of the anaphoric adverbial then. By the time the adverbial is interpreted,
the temporal location of the event described by the host clause is not yet constructed,
whereas the temporal location of the event in the preceding sentence is available and
prominent, and is therefore picked out by the adverbial. Again, the NRC is attached
outside the scope of if, Narration(φ ,χ), and is therefore interpreted globally.
(20) [ Nick stuck out his tongue at Jamie. ]φ adapted from
If [ Jamie, [ who then hit him, ]χ had simply left instead, ]ψ Koev 2013
he wouldn’t have realized that he insulted her.
3 Note the parallelism between this inference and Gricean relevance implicature. Just as the message
there is a garage around the corner is more relevant on the assumption that the garage is open rather
than closed, the proposition the dean hates me is more relevant assuming global attachment than
assuming local attachment.
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In sum, our main claim is that the pragmatic inference that leads to the integration
of the content of an NRC in sentence and discourse semantics follows the same
principles and is affected by the same factors as the inference of coherence relations
in general. That is, in principle, any coherence relation that can hold between
juxtaposed independent sentences can also hold between an NRC and its host clause
or broader context. Similarly, whether an NRC is attached to its host clause, the
whole sentence, or any other appropriate antecedent, depends on the same factors
that determine the attachment site of an independent sentence in discourse structure.
This, however, does not explain Schlenker’s intuition supported by Poschmann’s
experiments that NRCs can be attached locally only by a small subset of coherence
relations. In the next sections we show that different coherence relations are not
equally suitable for local discourse attachment.
4.2 The source of coherence
Whether or not a coherence relation and the discourse segments it connects can be
embedded under entailment-canceling operators depends on the source of coherence
of a given pair of segments (Sanders, Spooren & Noordman 1992), in particular,
whether it is the properties of the situations in the world described by those segments
or the properties of the speech acts that make the sequence coherent. Obviously, the
latter case presupposes that the discourse segments constitute independent speech
acts, which cannot be embedded under entailment-canceling operators. Schlenker
(2013) observes that NRCs attached by Elaboration or Explanation resist local
interpretation most strongly. In this section we argue that these coherence relations
have a tendency to accompany a relation that operates at speech act level and this is
what makes them unsuitable for local attachment of NRCs. This will require a brief
excursus into theories of discourse coherence.
Coherence of a sequence of sentences can have its source in the relations between
states of affairs described by those sentences. The idea is that discourse is coherent
because ‘the world that is described is perceived as coherent’ (Sanders et al. 1992:
p. 7). A typical example of a system based entirely on this principle is Kehler 2002.
The list of coherence relations in (8) in section 2 de facto only contains relations
defined in semantic terms, and the same applies to the subsets used by Schlenker
(2013) and Poschmann (2018).
Coherence relations characterized in these terms do not impose any relevant con-
straints on the type of abstract entities they connect (events, propositions vs. speech
acts). Causal and spatiotemporal relations can hold between descriptions of even-
tualities, which can be actual, potential or counterfactual. Therefore, in principle,
nothing prevents these relations from holding in the scope of entailment-canceling
operators. However, since speech acts are events, they can also be connected by
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causal relations, as in the famous example (21) discussed by Sweetser (1990), where
the second sentence presents the cause for the speaker’s question.
(21) What are you doing tonight? Because there is a nice movie on.
In general, it appears that coherence relations characterized in terms of relations
in the world can happen to hold between speech acts, because speech acts are also
entities in that same world, but the definitions of the relations do not make reference
to anything specific to speech acts.
However, coherence may also result specifically from the relationship between
speech acts. In particular, one speech act (the satellite) may help to achieve the
communicative goal of another one (the nucleus). This characterization comes close
to the notion of presentational relations in RST (Mann & Thompson 1988: 257),
whose terminology we borrow. Relations that belong to this category are defined in
terms of the kind of goal the nucleus has, the way in which the nucleus potentially
fails in achieving that goal by itself, and the way in which the satellite helps to solve
that problem. For instance, if the nucleus is a directive (a request, a command, a
piece of advice, an offer, etc.), whose goal is to get the addressee to perform a certain
action, he/she may be reluctant or unable to perform it. Motivation (22) deals with
reluctance; Enablement (23) deals with potential objective obstacles.
(22) You should eat more vegetables. Vegetables are good for you.
(23) Please can you post these letters? The stamps are in the drawer.
The goal of an assertion is to get the addressee to believe a proposition or accept
it to a degree sufficient for the purposes of the exchange (Stalnaker 2002). If the
addressee is reluctant to believe or accept the proposition, Evidence (24) can be
provided to make it more plausible (adapted from Blakemore & Carston 2005).
(24) He must have been here recently. There are his footprints.
Justify is a relation, where the satellite is supposed to increase the addressee’s
readiness to accept the speaker’s right to present the nucleus. Example (21) above
could be considered an instance of Justify. Without the explanation in the second
sentence the question might be considered a rude interference with the addressee’s
personal affairs.
Finally, in a Background relation (25), the satellite (ψ) is supposed to increase
the addressee’s ability to comprehend the nucleus (φ ). [source of the example]
(25) [ This piece begins with an anacrusis, ]φ [ an unaccented note which is not
part of the first full bar. ]ψ
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Obviously, these relations can only connect speech acts, since their contribution to
the coherence of the discourse is based crucially on the properties of speech acts.
Therefore they cannot be embedded under operators like if. Indeed, there is no point
in providing evidence for something you do not assert, or motivating a course of
action you do not ask the addressee to commit to.4
In order to see how all this helps us to explain the scopal behaviour of Elaboration
and Explanation, it is necessary to clarify some important aspects of the notion of
source of coherence as we understand it. Notice that the definitions of semantic
relations in (8) and those of presentational relations are mutually compatible. In
fact, in most instances of presentational relations there will also be a causal or
resemblance relation at some level. For example, (25) is an instance of Background,
but the relation between the expressions anacrusis and an unaccented note which is
not part of the first full bar can also be characterized as Entity-Elaboration. That
is, the speaker uses Elaboration to provide Background. Motivation, Evidence and
Justify almost always involve causality. For instance, in (22) the addressee should
eat vegetables because they are healthy, and in (24), the speaker believes that ‘he’
must have been here recently because there are his footprints.
The reverse is not true: The coherence of a sequence can be due to semantic
relations between the described situations, without there being any presentational
component. In such cases, the speaker is simply describing a complex state of
affairs that cannot be put into just one clause. The speaker is forced to split the
content into manageable pieces and to order those pieces, and she uses the semantic
categories behind (8) as guiding principles for splitting and linearization. The
source of coherence of a given pair of discourse segments is the speaker’s reason to
produce these segments next to each other in the given order. If the speaker is just
describing different aspects of a complex state of affairs then the source of coherence
is semantic. If the speaker is using one segment to help achieve the communicative
goal of another then the source of coherence is pragmatic, presentational, or speech-
act-level, whichever you like to call it.
Looking back at the relations in (8) as guidelines for splitting and ordering
complex content, it is not difficult to notice that Elaboration and Explanation stick
out as rather counterintuitive. Elaboration is a relation between descriptions of the
same situation (or entity, in the case of Entity-Elaboration). But what is the point
4 The only apparent exception from this generalization is Background. Even if the phrase an unaccented
note which is not part of the first full bar in (25) helps understanding the entire preceding sentence,
it really only targets the expression anacrusis, which needs clarification. This expression can be
embedded under if, as in If this piece began with an anacrusis, an unaccented note which is not part
of the first full bar, ... However, the clarification only works if the speaker commits to the proposition
that an anacrusis is an unaccented note which is not part of the first full bar. This commitment is
communicated by an independent speech act. In other words, the satellite of a Background relation
must be a speech act in any case.
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of describing the same thing twice? As convincingly argued by Blakemore (1993,
1997), there must always be some other reason to produce an Elaboration, such as
Background in (25) which helps understand the first utterance.
As for Explanation, i.e. the backwards causal relation, the question arises of why
anyone who is simply trying to present a causally connected chain of events would
do it backwards, while they have Narration and Result as more intuitive discourse
strategies at their disposal? Of course, the speaker could forget to mention some
previous event, realize later that without it the story does not make sense or sounds
unconvincing, and try to repair it. But then, what the speaker is effectively doing
is providing Background or Evidence. Our hypothesis is that backwards causal
relations are generally used for presentational purposes.
In other words, an NRC that appears to elaborate on the host clause or to stand in
a backwards causal relation to it (as in (1) discussed in section 4.1, cf. (16), (18) and
(19)), will most of the time also provide Background, Evidence or some other kind
of presentational support for some speech act in the context. That means that its real
attachment site in the discourse structure is not local, that it represents a speech act
itself and therefore cannot appear in the scope of entailment-canceling operators.
4.3 Conjunction and juxtaposition
It turns out that Elaboration and Explanation differ from Narration, Result, Parallel
and Contrast also in another respect. Relations of the latter group are most naturally
expressed with a conjunction (but in the case of Contrast). Removing the conjunction
and replacing it by a period may slightly reduce the naturalness of the discourses,
but this is easily repaired by adding a discourse adverbial that explicitly signals
the relation, such as then for Narration (26b), or also for Parallel (27b). However,
whether with or without a conjunction, the inferred coherence relation remains intact.
(26) a. Peter called the dean, and she called the chair. Narration
b. Peter called the dean. (Then) She called the chair.
(27) a. Mary should stand in front of Peter. Parallel
and he should move a little closer to Max.
b. Mary should stand in front of Peter.
(Also,) He should move a little closer to Max.
Elaboration and Explanation show a different pattern: The most natural way of
expression is plain juxtaposition of independent sentences without any explicit
markers. Adding and may change the interpretation dramatically. In (28b), from
Carston 1993, the sentences are not understood to be about the same actress anymore,
and in (29b) the temporal order is reversed as compared to (29a) (Asher & Vieu
2005).
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(28) a. I met a great actress at the party. I met Vanessa Redgrave. Elaboration
b. I met a great actress at the party. And I met Vanessa Redgrave. Parallel
(29) a. John fell. Chris pushed him. Explanation
b. John fell, and Chris pushed him. Narration
This pattern is usually attributed to the semantics of the natural language conjunction
and, which is not equivalent to logical conjunction (Carston 1993; Blakemore &
Carston 1999, 2005; Txurruka 2003; Zeevat & Jasinskaja 2007). In particular,
Txurruka (2003) argues that the natural language conjunction and is only compatible
with coordinating relations in SDRT sense, which include Narration, Parallel,
etc. In contrast, Elaboration and Explanation are most typical representatives of
subordinating relations. (More on this distinction in section 5.) Zeevat & Jasinskaja
(2007) propose that and requires the propositions it connects to serve as distinct
answers to the same topic question, such as Who did the speaker meet at the party?
in (28b), What happened to John? in (29b). Alternatively, that topic question can be
seen as an abstract of the content of the conjoined discourse segments, implemented
in the notion of Coordinated Discourse Topic (CDT) in SDRT (Txurruka 2003).
All coordinating coherence relations must have a CDT, and the inference of such
relations requires finding an appropriate CDT, or topic question. That means that
inferring a coordinating relation in the absence of an explicit and basically involves
‘inferring an implicit and’.
In section 3 we came forward with the thesis that, unlike coordinate clauses
connected by and or but, NRCs do not give you a conjunction ‘for free’. While
and and but tell us explicitly how to combine the propositions expressed by their
conjuncts in the semantics, NRCs do not generally tell us how to combine the
propositions of the host clause and the NRC. The case is delegated to pragmatics,
and only if we can infer a coherence relation between the NRC and the host clause
that conjoins them at propositional level, does the NRC contribute locally to the
semantics of the sentence. Coordinating coherence relations contain an equivalent
of natural language conjunction as part of their semantics. This is why NRCs can
be interpreted locally, as in (2) and (7), if they are attached to the host clause by
Narration, Parallel, Contrast, etc. Since coordination with and or but still remains
a preferred way of expression for these relations, local readings of the respective
NRCs remain less salient and probably slightly degraded (about 50% availability in
Poschmann’s 2018 experiments). But just like in (26), adding an adverbial improves
their acceptability (up to 83% in Poschmann’s 2018 experiments).
Elaboration and Explanation work differently. Blakemore & Carston (1999,
2005) have argued that the purely semantic essence of these relations—identity or
part-whole relations between the described situations in the case of Elaboration and
backwards causality in the case of Explanation—are in principle compatible with
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and. In a carefully constructed context like (30), there may be a backwards causal
relation between the conjuncts of and, but it is clear that the cause (John tripped
on a Persian rug) is not used to support, i.e. provide Evidence, Background for, or
Justify the effect (John broke his leg). Rather, the conjoined clauses stand on a par
as arguments against A’s claim that the mats are not dangerous. Since the backwards
causal relation is not accompanied by a presentational one, nothing prevents it from
holding in the scope of if, with and (31), or even with an NRC (32).
(30) A: Bob wants me to get rid of these mats. He says he trips over them all the
time. Still, I don’t suppose he’ll break his neck.
B: Well, I don’t know.
JOHN | broke his leg | and HE | tripped on a PERSian RUG |
(31) If Bob breaks his leg and he trips on one of your mats, you will have to pay
his medical bills.
(32) If this happens to Bob, who trips on one of your mats, you will have to pay
his medical bills.
Presumably, this is what is going on in exceptions like (33) where an NRC appears
to be attached locally by Elaboration (note that (33) can also be paraphrased with
and without change in interpretation).
(33) If you get an email from Bill, who writes that he got a job, don’t trust it.
This is an instance of purely semantic Elaboration, that is only concerned with mere-
ological relations between events and does not carry any additional presentational
functions. However, cases like (33) and (32) are exceptions, rather than the rule. As
we argued in section 4.2, Elaboration and Explanation normally go together with a
presentational relation and therefore connect speech acts. Presumably, this is also
one of the reasons why they are so naturally expressed by juxtaposed independent
sentences. In sum, it is not the semantic content of Elaboration and Explanation
that is incompatible with natural language conjunction and and unsuitable for local
attachment of NRCs, but their typical pragmatic function as Evidence, Motivation,
Justify and Background.
5 Why do NRCs project most of the time?
In the previous section, we explained why NRCs connected to their host clause
by a coordinating coherence relation (Result, Narration, Parallel, Contrast) are
interpreted locally, and (normally) interpreted globally if they express a so-called
subordinating relation, like Elaboration or Explanation. But why is the global
interpretation of NRCs so pervasive, that until very recently we even believed that
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they always project? Our answer is: Because NRCs are syntactically subordinate
clauses (an a par with adverbial and complement clauses), and subordinate clauses
express subordinating coherence relations most of the time.
The distinction between subordinating and coordinating relations in discourse
structure should not be confused with the syntactic notion of subordination (Blühdorn
2008). Subordinate clauses are distinguished from matrix clauses in terms of specific
syntactic behavior and formal properties (e.g. final position of the verb in German).
Subordinating coherence relations differ from the coordinating ones not only in
that they do not have CDTs, but also in the way they influence the prominence
and accessibility of attachment points in discourse structure and antecedents for
anaphora. Roughly, discourse-structurally subordinate material is relatively less
prominent. In general, the interpretation of discourse proceeds from left to right, and
the last-processed, rightmost, discourse unit is most prominent and most accessible
for the attachment of new discourse material. However, if the most recent discourse
unit is connected to the previous one by a subordinating relation, then the less recent
superordinate unit is relatively more accessible (the generalization referred to in the
literature as the Right Frontier Constraint, going back to Polanyi 1988; Webber 1991).
That is, it can still serve as a discourse attachment point and provide antecedents for
anaphora. In (34) for example, the first two sentences are related by Parallel, which
is coordinating. Since the discourse proceeds from left to right, the most accessible
referent for the pronoun she is the subject of the sentence preceding the pronoun,
Sue. In (35), by contrast, the first two sentences are related by Explanation, which
makes the second sentence subordinate to the first. Accordingly, both Mary and Sue
are possible antecedents for the pronoun she.
(34) Mary repaired the roof. Sue painted the wall. SheSue ... Parallel
(35) Mary repaired the roof. Sue told me so. SheMary/Sue ... Explanation
Syntactic subordination has a similar effect on prominence. A pronoun is less likely
to refer to an antecedent in a subordinate clause, than to one in a main clause, even if
the subordinate clause is more recent (see Clark & Sengul 1979: exp. 3, Cooreman
& Sanford 1996, and Frazier & Clifton 2005 for related experimental studies):
(36) a. Mary left before Sue arrived. SheMary > Sue ... main-subordinate
b. Mary left. Then Sue arrived. SheSue ... main-main
c. After Mary left, Sue arrived. SheSue ... subordinate-main
Syntactic and discourse subordination need not go together. Discourse subordination
is possible without syntactic subordination, as in (35), as well as syntactically
subordinate clauses need not necessarily express subordinating coherence relations.
However, it seems that subordinate clauses are particularly well suited to encode
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discourse-structural subordination. This is manifested in a statistical tendency
for subordinate clauses to realize subordinating coherence relations (Matthiesen
& Thompson 1988: 308), and non-restrictive relative clauses are no exception
in this respect. In Loock’s (2007) study of 450 English NRCs collected from
texts of four different genres, only 20, i.e. 4.5%, were continuative, i.e. discourse-
structurally coordinated (Holler 2008). Even if we do not yet understand the factors
that determine whether a subordinate clause will be used to express a coordinating
coherence relation, we have no reasons to believe that those factors will lead to an
entirely different distribution under entailment-canceling operators.
In sum, NRCs express subordinating coherence relations like Elaboration and
Explanation most of the time because their syntactically subordinate nature perfectly
matches the prominence-related properties of these relations. As we have argued
in the previous section, Elaboration and Explanation, in turn, tend to be used in
connection with a presentational relation that requires that the NRC functions as an
independent speech act and therefore cannot be embedded under operators like if.
6 Conclusions and outlook
In this paper, we started out with a set of previously unexplained observations about
the scopal behavior of non-restrictive relative clauses, which turned out to allow
for local interpretation in the scope of a conditional in an even greater variety of
cases than previously believed. The theoretical explanation of NRC scope that we
have developed is based on a minimal number of assumptions. Our central claim
concerning the semantics of NRCs is that they (by themselves) do not provide any
semantic link to the proposition expressed by the host clause, not even a plain
conjunction. That link needs to be inferred pragmatically, in the same way as
coherence relations are inferred between independent sentences in discourse. The
rest of the story comes from the theory of discourse coherence. The way coherence
inferences work in general and the properties of different classes of coherence
relations explain why local interpretation is only possible for NRCs connected to their
host clause by relations like Narration and Parallel, why relations like Elaboration
and Explanation force global attachment and global interpretation of NRCs, and why
NRCs in general show such a strong tendency for global interpretation. This study
is an example of how discourse theory can be used to solve a problem in sentence
semantics.
The approach we have developed makes predictions that go beyond the small
set of data that we were able to discuss on these pages. In particular, it describes
the behavior of non-restrictive relatives under entailment-canceling operators of any
kind, but we have only tested it on conditionals. Further research is needed to see
whether NRCs show the same pattern in other non-veridical environments. We also
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did not have a chance to pay proper attention to the aspectual properties of NRCs,
whose influence on their scope seems to go beyond the effects of coherence relations.
This, too, as well as a precise formal implementation of our theory remains a task
for the future.
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